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Abstract: This study investigates voter decision making on two smart growth components: land 
preservation and affordable housing. We seek to understand how voters make concurrent 
decisions about unpaired smart growth components at the ballot box. Previous studies of smart 
growth, affordable housing, and environmental preservation have focused primarily on 
describing the attitudes and traits of voters on these policies, utilize aggregate voting outcomes, 
or are case studies of single towns in which there is a fairly homogenous group of residents 
either supporting or opposing the policy. We draw on a unique data set to investigate the 
different covariates of attitudes for environmental preservation and affordable housing: an exit 
poll of voters in the 2016 Rhode Island General Election on bond referendums for environmental 
preservation and affordable housing. We find that the coalition for smart growth that includes 
both land preservation and affordable housing is undermined by views of minorities and the poor 
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“The environmental justification for [growth control] policies that just happen to increase 
existing home values is a shield against outside criticism of exclusion and a source of 
unification among homeowners with otherwise unequal interest in the policies.” -- Fischel 
(2017, p. 7)  
Columnist and economist Paul Krugman (2017) argues that both political parties get 
land-use regulation “wrong.” Places with a high degree of housing regulation, he points out, are 
better prepared for environmental disasters and have less traffic congestion and pollution, but 
these regulations stifle economic growth and the economic prospects of the working class by 
driving up housing prices (Krugman 2017).  Clearly, smart land use has two distinct but 
inextricably linked elements: land preservation and housing affordability. Regardless of which, if 
you have one but not the other, there are negative social and environmental repercussions 
(Downs 2004). As a result, local and state government efforts to conserve land helps the 
environment, but also acts as an “exclusionary zoning policy” because these programs keep out 
lower income renters and owners by reducing “the supply of land for more affordable and/or 
denser forms of housing and thereby displace growth to even further exurban areas, exacerbating 
the sprawl they claim to thwart.” (Schmidt and Paulson 2009, 97). As a result, land protection 
policies that do not make allowances for affordable development can cause even more sprawl as 
well as racial and economic exclusion (Ibid). This is largely because the preservation of open 
space drives up housing prices both locally and regionally (e.g. Irwin 2002; Geoghegan et al 
2003; e.g., Geoghegan 2002; Luttik 2000; Sander and Polasky 2009; Irwin and Bockstael 2004; 
Lang 2018) and leads to economic segregation (Pendall 2000; Rothwell and Massey 2010; Lens 
and Monkkonen 2016). As Lang (2018) notes “average housing prices increase about .68-1.12% 
for every $1000 per household of open space spending authorized.” While the appreciation 
 
implies that households value land conservation, conservation also leads housing prices to 
escalate out of the reach of lower and median income households. 
As a result of this paradox, land planners promoting “smart growth” or “growth 
management” advocate for preserving land and building affordable housing through well-
designed regional plans (e.g. Nelson et al 2002). However, in most scenarios, politicians and 
voters consider policies on land use in isolation—an environmental preservation initiative here 
and a regulation to preserve or increase affordability of housing there—not in tandem. This is 
especially true in referendums where the money to implement community land-use initiatives has 
to be approved by voters.  
Referendums are also an especially attractive means of local policymaking because they 
allow policymakers to punt important policy decisions to voters. When voters choose policy 
issues one at a time, rather than together, they will often make different choices because trade-off 
preferences differ from distinct preferences when voters struggle to see the logical link between 
seemingly disparate policy areas (e.g. Dyck 2006; Lacy and Niou 2004).  This 
disparity/discongruity is exacerbated by the fact that the coalitions that advocate for land 
preservation and those that advocate for affordable housing are separate and unique (Kling et al. 
1995; Orfield 2002; Phelps and Wood 2011; Phelps et al. 2010; McCauley and Murphy 2013; 
Fischel 2017) so voters do not link the two issues in their minds. But also, importantly, housing 
policy is critically intertwined with the politics of economic and racial privilege (Squires and 
Kubrin 2005).  
We seek to understand the political, racial/class dynamics of outcomes of unpaired smart 
growth proposals by taking two intertwined progressive agenda items and investigating the 
political coalitions that fraction support for policies that can both preserve the environment and 
 
promote socioeconomic mobility, stability, and equality of opportunity as defined by geography. 
Our approach greatly improves upon previous studies. First, there is an extremely limited 
number of studies that examine preferences of individuals on smart growth proposals either 
individually or when combined. Second, we improve upon most public opinion surveys by 
utilizing an exit poll of voters who had just cast ballots on two smart-growth ballot referendums. 
Thus, we are able to capture voter attitudes just moments after they have made a decision to 
support both, one of, or none of the smart growth proposals. 
Here, we analyze patterns of individual voting choices on two ballot referendums on the 
2016 Rhode Island General Election ballot regarding environmental preservation and affordable 
housing to uncover the micro-level determinants of macro-electoral outcomes.  In effect, we 
investigate the question “if smart growth is popular in theory, why do we see it so rarely?” as 
posed by Downs (2005). And a second question: Is the reason the US has had so little smart 
growth that includes both affordable housing and land preservation due to negative stereotypes 
of minorities and the poor, as has been suggested by the extant case study literature? Our results 
support our hypothesis that voter decision making on the individual components of smart growth 
is more complex than has generally been portrayed in the land planning, political science, and 
economics literatures.  Attitudes toward target groups are correlated with the likelihood of 
breaking the coalition for smart growth and voting in ways that exacerbate sprawl and economic 
inequality. 
The Undeserving Poor, Interjurisdictional Competition and Housing/Land-Use Policy 
 
Housing and land-use policy has always been linked with the politics of race and class 
(e.g Rothstein 2017; Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 2006; Pulido 2000). Racial covenants 
were used for many decades by locales to keep African-Americans and other minorities from 
 
purchasing or renting housing units; however, after these policies were struck down by the 
Supreme Court and legal barriers to integration fell, neighborhoods and towns found other ways 
to constrain the ability of minorities to access housing. These policies took “race neutral” 
approaches and, as a result, had the effect of creating a formal structure of class, instead of race, 
segregation in the American housing market—that is, economic and racial housing segregation is 
at least partially due to policies that drive the price of housing beyond affordability in middle and 
upper class White areas (Squires and Kubrin 2005). 
While many of these policies appear aimed at environmental preservation, there is now a 
well-established literature from scholars in political science, economics, and land planning which 
argues that environmental justifications for restrictive voting practices are often an attempt by 
middle class White property owners to use environmental language for policies that are really 
aimed at White protectionism and housing exclusion (Fischel 2017; Schmidt and Paulsen 2009; 
Frieden 1979; Gottlieb 1993; Rome 2001). However, while aggregate studies and case studies 
lead these scholars to suggest that there is more than environmentalism driving these land-use 
policies, very few studies investigate individual level decision-making on smart growth 
referendums (see Wassmer and Lascher 2006; Mohamed 2008; Handy et al. 2008; Lewis and 
Baldassare 2010; Tian, Ewing and Greene 2015) and no literature that we know of investigates 
attitudes about minorities and the poor and attitudes toward smart growth measures using a large-
N study. Instead, studies that exist are largely based on aggregate data from elections and case 
studies of local land-use decisions. In addition, the literature to date has failed to take into 
account whether or not  the views attributed to individuals are a product of the ecological 
inference fallacy—where the actions that appear when using aggregate variables are not reliable 
 
for individuals (e.g. King, Tanner and Rosen 2004; also see Prendergast et al. 2019, specifically 
about ecological fallacy issues on views of land preservation).  
The research presented here improves on the literature by providing evidence of 
individual level views on unpaired smart growth proposals using a large-N study of actual voters 
that is able to control for individual perceptions of those perceived as benefiting from increased 
housing supply as well as opinions about environmental issues.  We propose that voter decision 
making on these questions at the ballot box will be linked to views of the poor and minorities as 
undeserving (e.g. Katz 1989) as well as views of the environment due to the ways in which 
voters make decisions when they lack full information. Foremost, support for social programs 
has long been wrapped up in views toward “target populations.” As Schneider and Ingram (1993, 
p. 334) explain, social constructions “become embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed 
by citizens and affect their orientations and participation.” The target populations for 
environmental preservation are seen as benefiting “strong and positive” target populations—
farmers, hikers and bikers, endangered species, and existing homeowners—while limiting 
development that might service lower income minorities (e.g. Schmidt and Paulsen 2009; Fischel 
2017). Affordable housing, on the other hand, is associated with “weak and negative” target 
populations, most specifically, the “undeserving poor” (e.g. Katz 1989; Gilens 1999; Vale 2002; 
Tighe 2012). The “undeserving poor” is a term coined by Katz (1989) to explain how, 
throughout American history, impoverished people have been seen as people who do not deserve 
sympathy primarily because their poverty is seen as a result of laziness and immorality. This 
view of poverty is one of personal failure and used to justify a non-governmental approach to 
poverty—if it is the individual’s fault they are impoverished, then it is the individual’s (and not 
the government or society’s) responsibility to remedy the issue. 
 
In line with a long line of scholarship regarding public support for social program 
investment and views of the “undeserving poor,” we assert that support for/opposition to smart 
growth development that includes affordable housing is linked to views of the perceived 
beneficiaries of government investment in affordable housing. Voters with views consistent with 
a view of the “undeserving poor” will be more likely to support land preservation/acquisition and 
oppose investment in affordable housing—in effect, stereotypes of those who benefit from 
investments in affordable housing will lead voters to “break the coalition” for smart growth. 
Second, we propose that people may have strong place-based identities and identify 
politics as a competitive jurisdictional game. Where people live profoundly influences how 
people understand politics. As Cramer (2016) notes, White voters from outside the cities, view 
politics through a geographic lens whereby government is an agent redistributing resources to 
benefit urban minorities at the expense of rural Whites. Many land-use policies, including open 
space preservation as well as affordable housing and other new development projects, have 
consequences that are perceived differently in different geographic areas. For example, despite 
the fact that jobs for the working class sprawl across states and are not located in concentrated 
urban environments in most places (Ewing et al. 2016), and the vast majority of the United States 
lacks adequate affordable housing (Getsinger et al. 2017), many suburbanites argue that 
affordable housing is not needed in their communities because it is not where the working class 
currently lives. Affordable housing is perceived as a “city issue.”  
If policies have a spatial element (e.g. housing is built in one area, a farm is preserved in 
another) the costs of these policies fall on people differently depending on where they live. 
Research suggests that open space preservation is generally most popular in areas in which there 
are or once were significant land-based natural resources (farms, forests, wetlands) and where 
 
there has been a high degree of development threatening those resources (e.g. Kotchen and 
Powers 2006) and, importantly, is highly associated with perceptions of land use but not with 
objective measures of land use (Prendergast et al. 2019). Thus, voters likely vote for/against 
these initiatives in response to where they think the land will be preserved and where the housing 
will be built (also see Mohamed 2008). In the case of support for government expenditures on 
smart growth elements, then, one would expect that voters weigh how they believe the 
expenditures will affect their community. Particularly when it comes to state or regional plans, 
voters also consider how the money will be spent since both policies may be perceived as having 
diffuse costs but concentrated benefits (Gerber and Phillips 2003). Thus, there is some inter-
jurisdictional competition for resources.  
In the case of open space preservation, voters are likely to assume that if the money is 
spent in their jurisdiction, the externalities created will be positive. Preservation of farms and 
forests could have a positive or at least non-negative impact on housing values, traffic is not 
likely to increase, and public expenditures will not be affected beyond the initial expenditure to 
acquire the land. In effect, spending on open space preservation is spending to protect the status 
quo against development perceived as having negative externalities (e.g. Gerber and Phillips 
2003). People may then be willing to vote in favor of the proposition when they believe the 
preservation will occur in their town. However, in the case of affordable housing, we would 
expect the inverse. There is a long tradition of people battling the development of affordable 
housing in their community (e.g. Dear 1992; Scally 2012; Scally et al. 2013; Tighe 2010). Thus, 
we expect voters who believe their town will be the recipient of the state’s investment in 
affordable housing will be less inclined to support it. Generating from this theory we propose 
that, while voters will be more likely to vote for environmental preservation if they think it will 
 
be in their town, they will be more likely to vote against affordable housing if they think it will 
be in their town —the opposite of a “smart growth” plan. 
There are a host of other factors that may go into the decision to vote for or against each 
of these issues, and we control for as many of these factors as possible. However, none are clear 
that they would lead voters to split their vote except concern over the environment and 
population. Much of the literature on land preservation and growth management focuses on 
concerns over the environment and population growth and has suggested that the link between 
these comes from the fact that the state’s role in growth management developed out of and at the 
same time as the environmental and population sustainability movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
(Bengston et al 2004; Fischel 2017). However, people may not fully understand how access to 
affordable housing affects the environment, despite that when affordable housing is concentrated 
in silos and not well distributed to all areas where low income work is available, the working 
class have to commute farther (Cervero and Duncan 2006), emitting more exhaust and resulting 
in other negative environmental effects. Thus, we posit that concerns over the environment and 
population growth may lead voters to split their ticket and vote for environmental preservation 
efforts and against affordable housing measures which would suggest that it is not due to racial 
concerns but truly are driven by concern (and a misunderstanding) over the environment. 
Study Data and Methodology 
This study seeks to understand the correlates of voter decision making on two smart 
growth components: land preservation/acquisition and affordable housing. Specifically, we 
investigate whether voters utilize different heuristics when weighing how to vote on the different 
components of smart growth when they are presented as discrete choices. Previous studies of 
smart growth, affordable housing, and environmental preservation focus primarily on describing 
 
the attitudes and traits of voters on these policies, utilize aggregate voting outcomes, or are case 
studies of single towns in which there is a fairly homogenous group of residents either 
supporting or opposing the policy. We improve upon this research by drawing on a unique 
dataset to investigate the different covariates of attitudes for land preservation and affordable 
housing: an exit poll of voters in the 2016 Rhode Island General Election. This election was a 
unique opportunity to study attitudes toward the discrete components of smart growth policies 
because it contained two bond referendum questions pertaining to each unique aspect of smart 
growth. One referendum sought approval for bonds for environmental purposes explicitly 
including land preservation/acquisition; the other referendum sought approval for bonds to build 
affordable housing. These two distinct referendums, occurring on the same ballot, offer a unique 
opportunity to understand the competing factors that influence opinions on smart growth 
proposals, specifically voters’ concerns about target groups and the geographic nature of state 
expenditures. 
The Context of the Rhode Island Exit Poll 
 Unlike sunbelt cities, where affordable housing has come at the cost of land preservation, 
Rhode Island voters have been very active over the last few decades in preserving the 
environment. Several studies have focused on attitudes toward land preservation in New England 
and, specifically, Rhode Island (e.g. Altonji et al 2016; Johnston et al. 2003; Swallow and 
McGonagle 2006). The state has had sixty-one local and statewide ballot questions to preserve 
undeveloped land since 1998 (LandVote 2019).  As a result, the land available for the building of 
new homes has become relatively scarce. Rhode Island also has had quickly increasing housing 
costs while simultaneously experiencing fairly stagnant economic growth (e.g. Housing Works 
2016).  
 
The 2016 ballot in Rhode Island reflected both of these pressures. Question 6, titled 
“Green Economy,” (GE) sought approval for the state to issue a bond for 35 million dollars 
which included eight million dollars in open space land acquisition in addition to money for the 
beautification of or restoration of existing open space (such as building of bike paths and park 
restoration). Question 7, titled “Housing Opportunity,” (HO) sought approval for the state to 
issue a bond for 50 million dollars to build affordable housing (40 million) and support urban 
redevelopment (10 million). A copy of the ballot for these items is included in Appendix B.  
Most existing research on “NIMBY” and “YIMBY”-ism focus on the small group of citizens 
who actively come and either work for or against a proposed project. However, these highly 
engaged citizens are usually quite different from the average voter. Our survey is an 
improvement over existing research because we are able to capture the views of a cross-section 
of voters focusing on two ballot initiatives in the real world. 
 To harness the uniqueness of this election, in which both issues were on the ballot 
simultaneously, the authors conducted a survey of voters exiting the polls on Election Day about 
their voting choices on these two bonds. A full description of the exit poll and its methods is 
included in the supplementary appendix. The questions were field tested prior to the election and 
the survey was offered in both Spanish and English.1 Polling locations were determined to reflect 
the racial, ethnic and political distribution of the state. However, Democratic voters agreed to 
take the survey more than Republican voters, as is quite common in exit polls (Best and Krueger 
2012), despite attempts to oversample areas with high Republican voting. White voters were also 
slightly overrepresented. To account for these issues, weights are used to reflect the state’s 
demographics according to the 2010 census,2 the actual presidential vote and the actual outcome 
 
for the two bond referendums. Although we present weighted data throughout this paper, the 
results are substantively equivalent if weights are not included in the models. 
 Another benefit of this design is that ballot referendums offer a unique opportunity to 
study public opinion in practice—where the rubber meets the road—instead of when there are no 
real consequences to a voter’s opinion on an issue. While public opinion polls do very well at 
gauging public support for broad ideas, things often change when voters are actually asked to 
approve specific measures, designed to achieve broad goals, on the ballot (e.g. Bowler and 
Donovan 2004; Dyck and Lascher 2009). By focusing on real ballot questions, our research 
provides a better measure of popular attitudes because we ask about actual decisions that voters 
made, just moments before, about what their tax dollars will pay for as well as the direction their 
state will take in terms of growth management. The survey is an improvement over existing 
research because we are able to capture the views of a cross-section of voters focusing on two 
ballot initiatives in the real world instead of either a) using demographic variables which may 
present ecological fallacy problems as many studies of referendums do or b) studying only very 
actively engaged citizens that show up at town hall meetings and protests as many case studies 
do. That said, one drawback of studying these bond referendums is that while they asked voters 
to approve funds for general programs, the referendums do not specify where these funds will be 
spent. Considerable evidence suggests that voters may approve of these types of programs in 
general but reject them when they get “closer to home.” For example, Gerber and Phillips (2003) 
find that voters who vote for pro-growth ballot referendums are more likely to vote in favor the 
further away they are from the project. Whereas research on open space, bike paths, and other 
conservation efforts suggests local voters desire these projects to be in their neighborhood (e.g. 
Romero and Liserio 2002). Thus, while voters may have voted for these issues on the ballot, 
 
there may not be the same acceptance of the actual programs these bonds will pay for once 
locations are proposed. Nevertheless, given the strong external validity of our research and the 
fact that we capture views of actual voters across a state, this research offers an original and 
important contribution. 
Variables 
The second and third questions on the survey asked the respondents how they voted on 
each of the two bonds of interest. The answer options included: “approve,” “reject,” and “I left 
this question blank.” Following the method employed by Mohamed (2008) to measure the 
differences between voters on open space preservation and voters who supported urban 
revitalization, we combined the voters’ responses on these two referendums to place respondents 
into one of four categories of a multinomial variable: 
1) Voted to approve neither bond question (Group 1) 
2) Voted to approve “Housing Opportunity” only (Group 2) 
3) Voted to approve “Green Economy” only (Group 3) 
4) Voted to approve both bond questions (Group 4—comparison group) 
Table 1 shows the weighted percentage of respondents who fell into each group. A 
majority voted in favor of both bonds. For those who chose to vote for only one, more voters 
supported “Green Economy” (GE) than “Housing Opportunity” (HO): Only about 7% of voters 
cast a ballot approving HO bonds but rejecting GE bonds, whereas just over 14% said they voted 
to approve GE bonds but rejected the HO bonds.3  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 The combination of these four groups into one multinomial variable allows us to utilize 
multinomial regression so that we can compare voters in each group to a common reference 
group. In this case, that reference group is Group 4 (respondents voting to approve both GE 
bonds and HO bonds). This group was chosen because it is the coalition group necessary for 
smart growth and the voters that vote in favor of both elements. It is those who voted for one 
bond but not the other who are the focus of our study. Multinomial regression coefficients can be 
interpreted as representing the log-odds of a respondent falling into that category versus the 
reference category when all other variables in the model are held constant. Thus, the results 
present the log-odds that a voter belongs to Groups 1, 2 or 3 relative to Group 4.  
The independent variables of interest fall into several categories to test our hypotheses 
and control for other factors. The first hypothesis asserts that voter decision-making on these 
bonds will be correlated with views of the deservingness of minorities and the poor (e.g. views of 
the “undeserving poor”). For this variable, we utilize an additive index of two questions that 
capture views towards minorities and the poor. The survey asked voters the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with a series of statements.4 The two statements we utilize to tap into 
respondents’ views of the deservingness of the poor are “Low income residents are a burden on 
the local school system” and “If minorities would only try harder they could be just as well off as 
Whites.”5 These two variables were specifically designed to capture how people view the target 
groups most associated with affordable housing and those that would benefit from increased 
growth in residential units. We used both a measure of minorities and the poor because the 
literature (e.g. Katz 1989; Gilens 1999) points to the fact that minorities have been widely 
portrayed by the media as overrepresented among the poor, and when the poor are presented 
negatively they are overwhelmingly presented as also from a marginalized racial/ethnic group. 
 
However, these two views should be additive in nature—those who are the most negative toward 
both minorities and the poor should be the most likely to reject affordable housing but approve of 
land regulations that decrease access to new groups of residents.  
Our first hypothesis expects higher values on this variable to be positively correlated with 
a respondent’s likelihood of being in Group 3—supporting “Green Economy” bonds only (e.g. 
voting for “Green Economy” and against “Housing Opportunity”) compared to voting for both 
bonds. 
The next two hypotheses assert that voters will vote based on where they expect the 
money from the bonds will be spent, comparing their town to other towns in the state. We test 
these hypotheses by utilizing two questions on the survey. For both bonds, the survey included 
the question “If approved, how much of the money from the [Green Economy/Housing 
Opportunity] Bonds do you think will be spent in your city/town?” Respondents could choose 
“similar to other towns”, “more than other towns” or “less than other towns.” Given the research 
on NIMBY responses to affordable housing and YIMBY responses to environmental 
preservation reviewed above, we expect that those who think their town will receive more money 
than others on GE bonds will be more likely to vote in favor of GE bonds and those who think 
their town will get more money on HO bonds will be more likely to vote against HO bonds. As a 
result, those who believe their town will get more GE money and more HO money will be more 
likely to “break the coalition” and cast their ballot in favor of only the GE bonds compared to 
voting for both (and so, more likely to be in Group 3). Whereas those who think they will get 
more GE and less HO should be more willing to support both bonds. 
These hypotheses are consistent with Gerber and Phillip’s (2003) findings that voters 
tend to support pro-growth policies if voters perceive the growth as far away and so the negative 
 
externalities of the development would be felt by other areas than their own while believing that 
they will benefit by the positive externalities (employment and economic growth) as well as 
many studies’ findings that voters are willing to pay for local land acquisition as they perceive it 
as having a direct positive effect on their housing prices (e.g. Fischel 2017).  
Our fourth hypothesis posits that those who are the most concerned about the 
environment will also be the most likely to fall into Group 3, and vote for GE bonds but against 
HO bonds. However, if Fischel (2017) and Schmidt and Paulsen (2009) are correct that 
environmentalism is only a justification for supporting exclusionary, home value-increasing 
regulatory practices, we should see that environmentalism is unassociated with being in Group 3. 
We test this hypothesis utilizing two questions regarding people’s attitudes toward climate 
change and population growth. Again, these attitudes are measured utilizing two agreement 
statements. The first stated “Climate change is a major concern” and the second stated “We are 
approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support.”6  
There is the chance that voter preferences on statewide ballot referendums, unlike local 
initiatives, may be a reflection more of voters’ general ideological attitudes and their attitudes 
toward government in general than of their views about the specific policy. To account for this, 
we include a host of control variables meant to capture general ideological preferences that could 
affect voting on these bond referendums. The first set of control variables generate from a set of 
agree/disagree statements regarding the economy that are likely correlated with attitudes toward 
the government’s role in building homes and preserving land. These include: (1) “The 
government should not be involved in regulating the economy,” (2) “Building more homes in my 
community would benefit the local economy,” and (3) “I trust the state government to do what is 
right most of the time.” We expect those who believe building homes to be beneficial to the 
 
economy to be positively correlated to voting for HO bonds and against GE bonds (Group 2). In 
regard to building homes (2) and government trust (3), the effect of building homes should 
increase the likelihood of the voter being in group 1, 2 or 4 and decrease the likelihood of the 
voter being in group 3. Government trust should lead voters to vote for neither and does not have 
a clear association with voting for one bond over the other, which is our primary interest.  
 We also include two indicators of the voter’s financial situation. The statement “My 
family struggles to meet expenses each month” taps into the level of financial security felt by the 
respondent. We expect those who are struggling to meet expenses will be more likely to support 
HO bonds (Group 2 or 4). In addition, we asked “When housing prices in your area increase, 
how does it affect you?” (with response options of very beneficial, somewhat beneficial, 
somewhat harmful, or very harmful). Intuitively, we expect that people who perceive housing 
price increases as harmful to be more likely to support HO bonds over both (Group 2) and those 
who perceive it as beneficial to support GE bonds over both (Group 3).  
We also include a standard set of control variables including a 5-point party ID scale, 
homeownership, income, education, age, gender, and racial/ethnic identification. Given the 
prominence of the presidential election, we also control for having voted for Donald Trump. 
Based on the literature to date on both environmental preservation and affordable housing, we 
expect Republicans to be more likely to vote against both bonds (Group 1), but HO bonds in 
particular (Group 3), renters to be more likely to vote in favor of HO bonds than homeowners 
(Group 2), and White voters to be less likely to support HO bonds but to vote in favor of GE 
bonds (Group 3).  
Looking beyond the individual level, we also include a set of controls for the 
neighborhood in which the respondent lives based on the location of the precinct. These include 
 
median household income, percentage White, and percentage with a college education. To 
calculate these, we geo-referenced and matched the precinct voting location addresses in ArcGIS 
with census-tract level demographic statistics from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey 
5-Year estimates. Each of these variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 where 0 is the 
precinct with the lowest value and 1 is the precinct with the highest value. In general, several 
demographic variables have been found to correlate with attitudes toward affordable housing: 
High income and education areas tend to be the most opposed to affordable housing (Dear 1992; 
Koebel et al. 2004; Wilton 2002). Likewise, most research on open space preservation and land-
use planning that protects the environment focuses on demographic variables (e.g. York et al 
2013; Wassman and Lascher 2006; Lowry and Krummenacher 2016; Lowry 2018) and finds 
White, upper income, higher education areas support environmental preservation. 
The estimation equation takes the following form: 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝑉𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟)𝑖 +
𝛽2(𝑉𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈)𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑖 +
𝛽4(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽5(𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐)𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘     (3) 
where 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the support voter i in precinct k gave to the two bonds indexed by j. 𝛽1 
is the coefficient of interest in this model as it signifies the impact of the measure of attitudes 
toward minorities and the poor and 𝛽2 is a vector of coefficients on how the views of the 
distribution of spending affects the likelihood a respondent would support the bonds. 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 is a vector of individual level attitudes toward government, housing and 
the economy, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 is a vector of individual level demographic and political 




A brief review of some descriptive statistics shows some interesting findings in terms of 
people’s attitudes toward the bonds and where the money would likely be spent.7 About 45% of 
the sample said that their town would likely receive similar GE bonds as other towns and another 
42% of respondents said their town would get less than other towns. Only about 13% said they 
would receive more funds. Similarly, in terms of the HO bonds, 48% of respondents said their 
town would get less of the money from these bonds. About 39% said they would receive the 
same, and again, 14% said that their town would likely receive more of the funds. This finding 
suggests that voters in Rhode Island perceive their towns as having a competitive disadvantage 
against other towns when it comes to state spending. In terms of perceptions of the undeserving 
poor, respondents who voted against both bonds had a mean response of 2.79 on the undeserving 
poor additive measure, very similar to those who voted for the GE bonds only, with a mean of 
2.58. Those who voted for only HO bonds had a mean score of 2.1. The lowest average score on 
this variable was by those who voted for both bonds (1.54). We now turn to our full models.  
In order to test our hypotheses, we employ a multinomial probit model.8 The standard 
errors are clustered at the precinct level to account for the nested nature of the responses due to 
the survey collection methodology (e.g. collection at selected polling stations). Multinomial 
probit is utilized because it provides information on the odds that a citizen will fall into one of 
the groups as a function of the independent variables. Like binary logistic regressions, the odds 
are relative to a reference group. Again, the reference is Group 4 (respondents who voted “yes” 
to both bond referendums). Thus, the results present the odds that someone will belong to 
Groups 1 (voted for neither), 2 (yes on Housing Opportunity Bonds only) or 3 (yes on Green 
Economy Bonds only) relative to Group 4. We focus on the odds of a respondent falling into 
Group 2 or 3 (voted for one of the bonds only) relative to Group 4 because these two groups 
 
consist of people who are interpreted as willing to pay for one element of smart growth but not 
the other. Because multinomial probit coefficients are very difficult to interpret, we have 
graphically presented marginal effects for each of the primary independent variables that test our 
hypotheses and are statistically significant.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Group 1: Opposing Affordable Housing and Environmental Preservation 
 Group 1 represents those who are opposed to both elements of smart growth. What we 
cannot know is if this group simply opposes bonds altogether or if they oppose specifically these 
types of bonds. What we can tell from this is that compared to voters who supported both bonds, 
Group 1 voters were more likely to view minorities and the poor as undeserving. They were also 
more likely to think that the money from the GE bonds would not go to their town. Thus, this 
group, compared to Group 4 voters, does seem to have a large amount of racial and economic 
resentment and some concern over government distribution of resources to jurisdictions. They 
are also less likely to be concerned about Climate Change and more likely to think that the 
government should not be involved in the economy than Group 4 voters. Finally, voters in Group 
1 were less likely to believe that building homes is good for the economy or that housing is too 
expensive and much more likely to distrust the government and to be Republican and of higher 
income than Group 4 voters.  
Group 2: Supporting Affordable Housing, But Opposing Environmental Preservation 
As is clear in Table 1, very few people fall into Group 2. However, for those who do, 
only a few things correlate with the likelihood of being in Group 2 (compared to Group 4). We 
see no evidence supporting Hypothesis 3. Perceptions of where money would be spent on the HO 
 
bonds and GE bonds were not correlated with being in Group 2 compared to Group 4. This may 
be due to the fact that most respondents said the spending on the HO bond was unlikely to come 
to their town (only 11.67% responded their town was likely to get more funding than other towns 
for HO bonds). Further, there may be heterogeneity between groups about how HO spending 
could influence the town. For example, residents in neighborhoods in need of investment could 
see the building of new affordable homes as beneficial, whereas suburban residents likely view it 
negatively based on the extant literature. This heterogeneity could lead to statistical zeros but is 
beyond the scope of this study to determine. 
What the model does show is that compared to Group 4 voters, the more concerned 
respondents are about climate change, the less likely they are to have voted to approve HO bonds 
only. This indicates that for those who do support bonds, if they are not concerned about climate 
change, they are less likely to vote to invest state resources in “Green” projects. Several control 
variables are significant as well. Respondents who voted for HO bonds only were more likely to 
be against government involvement in the economy and to struggle financially compared to 
respondents who voted for both. Both of these make intuitive sense. Being a Democrat and being 
Black also increased the odds of being in this category, compared to Group 4. All these 
correlates are in the expected direction and none of the other demographic variables, including 
income and age, were statistically significant. 
Group 3: Opposing Affordable Housing, Supporting Environmental Preservation 
Group 3 is our primary outcome of interest. It is this group of voters that smart growth 
planners bemoan because their actions support efforts to preserve open space and beautify 
natural resources, but do not support offsetting the home price increases of these efforts that limit 
 
housing choices and increase segregation and commute times for low income workers. These 
voters also make up a larger percentage of the public. 
As hypothesized, views of minorities and the poor strongly predict the likelihood of a 
voter being in Group 3 (as well as Group 1). However, there is no evidence that concerns over 
state funding distributions or concern over climate change is correlated with being in Group 3. 
Only believing minorities and the poor are “undeserving” and concern over population growth 
are correlated with being in Group 3. In order to see the substantive effects of being in different 
categories on these variables, we have predicted marginal effects for each category of the 
independent variable on the likelihood of being in Group 3. We present these marginal effects in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 illustrates that moving from the lowest category (strongly disagree with both 
statements) to the highest category (strongly agree with both statements) results in a 19 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of a voter being in Group 3. Simply put, viewing the 
poor and minorities as undeserving is highly related to breaking the coalition for smart growth 
planning, lending strong support for our hypothesis. A 19 percentage point change is both 
statistically and substantively very large.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
We also see limited evidence, even though it is statistically significant in the model, that 
the effect of concern over population growth has a strong connection with the likelihood of being 
in Group 3. Figure 1 illustrates that moving from strongly disagreeing to strongly agreeing on the 
population growth statement results in a 7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
 
supporting GE bonds only. However, the standard errors on the marginal effects overlap, so we 
cannot be sure these results are substantive.  
Several other variables are statistically significant. Those with high trust in government, 
Democrats, and younger voters are less likely to vote for only GE bonds compared to voting for 
both bonds. Residents of towns with a larger share of White voters are also somewhat less likely 
to vote for GE bonds only. In addition, those who view building homes as having a positive 
benefit on the economy are less likely to be in Group 3 and those who struggle financially are 
somewhat more likely to be in this category compared to Group 4, although this finding is 
counterintuitive. Voters with higher levels of education are also more likely to be in Group 3. 
However, while these variables are statistically significant, for several of them the standard 
errors around the marginal effects overlap between the lowest and highest categories, calling into 
question how substantive the effects are. The marginal effects for government trust, family 
financial struggles, party ID, and income all have confidence intervals that overlap for the lowest 
and highest categories of the variables. Only attitudes about building homes, education, age, and 
precinct level education do not overlap. Figures displaying these effects are presented in 
Appendix C.  
The model presented from the 2016 Rhode Island Exit Poll suggests the extant literature 
is correct: Challenges to smart growth that includes both land preservation and affordable 
housing are often driven by negative views of minorities and the poor. Homeowners in particular 
are happy to adopt land preservation policies as they both retain open space and lead to the 
economic gain of their investments (e.g. Fischel 2017), but views of minorities and the poor 
dampen support for social policies that help offset the societal impact of those economic gains. 
While this is not full evidence in favor of Fischel’s (2017, 21) argument that “Environmental 
 
justification for policies that just happen to increase existing home values is a shield against 
outside criticism of exclusion and a source of unification among homeowners with otherwise 
unequal interest in the policies,” the model does suggest that environmentalism is not the reason 
voters break the coalition needed for truly “smart growth” and vote for only the policy that has 
the potential to drive up housing costs.  
One potential reason why the results are not stronger is that these bonds have such a large 
potential geographic impact. Thus, people had the ability to vote in favor of affordable housing 
but be confident that their neighborhood and home value would not be impacted by the 
investment as its highly likely the affordable housing would be built nowhere near them. We 
would expect this finding to be larger if people were voting on the same issue in their own town 
or if the bonds had specified where projects would be built, and this is a result that future 
research should investigate. 
However, clearly, much of the opposition to smart growth that includes affordable 
housing is based on views of minorities and the poor. While, again, we cannot tell the difference 
between voters in Group 1 who simply oppose bonds and those who oppose these land-use bonds 
in particular, the fact that the marginal effect of the variable on views of minorities and the poor 
is large and substantive in both conditions suggests that land planning opposition generates from 
concern over “who” benefits from government investment in land use. 
No studies that we know of study voter support specifically for the disaggregated 
elements of smart growth including affordable housing and environmental preservation. 
However, our findings can be compared somewhat to several articles that investigate voter 
support for growth control policies. Recent evidence by Prendergast et al. (2019) found that 
demographic variables that are determinants of open space and land-use preferences in aggregate 
 
studies were not all statistically significant in their national public opinion survey of open space 
preferences. They found that while racial identification and homeownership were related to 
increased support for open space, income and education were not. However, attitudinal variables 
such as perceptions of land use, concern about climate change and concern over traffic were 
related to support for land preservation. Wassmer and Lascher (2006) find concern over sprawl 
to be the largest predictor of support for state intervention in growth planning, as well as 
inconsistent evidence of the impact of demographic variables. Lewis and Baldassare’s (2010) 
study of support for compact development is perhaps the most comparable, and while they find 
that race, income, age, and the presence of children in the household are strongly associated with 
some views of different types of compact development, only conservative political ideology is 
consistently associated with opposition to compact development. We also find that conservative 
political ideology has a consistent impact on opposition to both environmental preservation and 
funding affordable housing. However, conservatives are also more likely to vote for open space 
preservation but against affordable housing. Mohamed’s (2007) study is also informative as his 
is the only study to look at smart growth in a way that looks at the coalition that supports the 
different elements at an individual level. His study focuses on those who support open space 
preservation as opposed to urban redevelopment. He finds that those who support open space but 
oppose urban redevelopment are more likely to be Democrats and those who are very satisfied 
with their neighborhood services compared to those who oppose both elements. Schmidt and 
Paulsen (2009, 95-96) suggest there are three ways to interpret voter behavior for open space 
preservation: (1) as “an intensification of or widespread acceptance of environmental awareness 
in response to the rapid pace of suburban development and its attendant degradation or 
destruction of landscapes;” (2) as “local land use planning tools as designed to protect the real 
 
estate interests of existing homeowners;” or (3) a “changing legal environment.” Their findings 
suggest evidence of the second: Voters support land preservation and oppose affordable housing 
as a way to make their neighborhoods more exclusive. Our evidence here suggests that their 
findings are supported by individual level survey data.  Perhaps the largest contribution of this 
analysis is that individual level attitudes toward target groups are highly significant, which is a 
large improvement over previous literature which suggests this to be true, but has not been able 
to test these hypotheses using a large dataset.  
Conclusion 
Between 1991 and 2013, the percentage of renter households in America paying at least 
half of their income to housing costs rose from 21% of renters to 30% of renters, despite the fact 
that the general standard for what families should pay is no more than 30% of income. In many 
rental markets the availability of affordable housing is so scarce that housing vouchers go unused 
because eligible renters cannot find rental units they can afford (Sullivan and Anderson 2017). 
For poor and moderate income families, purchasing a home has also become increasingly 
difficult. As both rent and home prices have increased, for those on a fixed budget saving for a 
down payment or affording monthly mortgage and tax payments is close to impossible. Median 
home prices have increased from $173,376 in 1975 (adjusted for inflation to 2017 dollars) to 
$315,100 (FRED 2017) in 2017 while median incomes have been basically stagnant (Piketty and 
Saez 2003).  
Most economic models suggest that physical houses can be supplied almost perfectly to 
meet demand except for the availability of land (Glaeser and Gyourko 2003, 28). And land, 
while in large supply theoretically, is quite constrained when local populations pass exclusionary 
land-use regulations that limit uses for available land, prevent building dense and/or multi-family 
 
units, curtail growth, or purchase open spaces to specifically prevent the building of residential 
and commercial real estate. At this point, there is significant evidence that the preservation of 
open space through land management policies drives up housing prices both locally and 
regionally (Irwin 2002; Geoghegan et al 2003; e.g., Geoghegan 2002; Luttik 2000; Sander and 
Polasky 2009; Irwin and Bockstael 2004; Lang 2018) and leads to economic segregation 
(Pendall 2000; Rothwell and Massey 2010; Lens and Monkkonen 2016). Thus, regional planning 
should, from a theoretical standpoint, deal with these two basic problems—the limited nature of 
environmental resources and the lack of affordable housing—together (Downs 2004). But, as 
Downs argues, “experience to date indicates that most growth management … efforts have not 
paid a lot of attention to providing more affordable housing” (Downs 2004, 2). In this paper, we 
take an important first step in building on the work of these scholars as well as at the different 
influences of voter decision making on land planning at the ballot box. While case studies 
focusing on affordable housing have argued that racism and wealth preservation were important 
drivers of voter opinion, and work on open space preservation adoption have argued the same, no 
one to date has conducted a large N survey of actual voters facing these land planning decisions. 
Our analysis finds that, indeed, voters are heavily influenced by their views of minorities and the 
poor, and that these views can break the coalition needed for “smart” land planning that takes 
into account housing affordability.  
Our research corroborates the views of many that the reason so many smart growth plans 
seem to drive up housing costs and exacerbate inequality (e.g. Downs et al. 2004) is not because 
smart growth per se does not include affordable housing, but because many homeowners reject 
that element of the equation—supporting land protections, walkability and other beautification 
efforts but not supporting proposals that include economic inclusivity.  
 
However, while our study documents this connection and supports the arguments of 
Fischel (2017) and Schmidt and Paulsen (2009), future research could improve upon this by 
surveying voters on paired smart growth proposals and experimenting to see how support differs 
based on the inclusion or exclusion of various elements including affordable housing. Moreover, 
future research should investigate what increases support for smart growth proposals that include 
housing equity.  
A specific limitation of our study is the nature of the statewide referendum. As is clear 
from our results, voters in statewide referendums may not be as concerned over the impact of 
these policies on their daily lives because they may believe that they can vote for a public good 
(e.g. affordable housing) without the danger of it being located “in their backyard.” Future 
research would be well served to investigate voter attitudes on smart growth proposals where the 
affordable housing element in particular is more clearly proposed geographically. We would 
expect our findings to be stronger in these cases as the immediate impact is closer to home, but 
this is a research question beyond the scope of our study and one deserving of further testing.  
Notes 
1 Polling teams assigned to high-Spanish speaking areas always included at least one bilingual 
native Spanish speaking pollster 
2 While we know that voters are not reflective of the population, there is no way to know the 
race, class or gender distribution of the actual electorate as the Board of Elections does not 
collect this information. Thus, using census data is the best available. However, using a weight 




3 The actual election results were 58% in favor of the Housing Opportunity Bonds and 67.6% in 
favor of the Green Economy Bonds. However, in the unweighted exit poll results 66.21% of 
respondents responded in favor of Housing Opportunity bonds and 78% responded in favor of 
the Green Economy Bonds. The numbers on the Housing Opportunity bonds are remarkably 
close to Tighe’s (2012) phone survey which asked respondents if they would approve of 
affordable housing in their neighborhood.  
4 Although agree/disagree statements are not ideal, given the space allowed on an exit poll, they 
were the best available with space constraints. 
5 These two variables are correlated at .44 (p-value .0000). Exploratory factor analysis also 
showed that they load well onto a single factor (eigen value of 1.4 and factor loadings of 8.4) and 
that the other attitudinal variables in the survey load on separate factors (or no factors); however, 
with just two variables factor analysis is considered inappropriate. The new variable additive 
scale has a mean of 1.7 (SD= 1.69) and ranges from 0 to 6 where 6 is those with the most 
negative views of the poor and minorities and 0 are those who feel most positively.  We also ran 
the models with the two variables included separately, it does not change the nature of the 
effects. These models are included in the supplemental appendix. However, because we believe 
that these two variables are additive in nature and that they are both measures tapping into the 
concept of the “undeserving poor”, we include them as a single item in our primary models.  
6 There is an argument to be made that these two variables should also be additive in nature. 
However, they only correlate at .24 and do not load well on a factor score. The results are also 
unchanged if adding them together or keeping them separate. As a result, we have decided to 
keep them separate in the analysis. 
 
 
7 Descriptive statistics of all the variables presented in the model are included in Appendix Table 
A 1. 
8 To check for robustness across modeling strategies we also ran the model as a multinomial logit 
and as a biprobit. The results are unchanged based on modeling strategy.  
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